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Neoliberalism and the Historians
This article analyses ‘Neoliberalism’ from a historical perspective, 
as a transnational political movement with a strong epistemic 
bent, engaged in reconfiguring state institutions and building a 
competitive market order. Drawing on methodological insights 
from Intellectual History and Political Economy, it focuses on the 
epistemic engagement of early Neoliberal thinkers in the field of 
historiography. By examining the writings of prominent intellec-
tuals who participated in the Mont Pèlerin Society, such as Frie-
drich Hayek, Karl Popper, T.S. Ashton, Walter Eucken, Ludwig 
von Mises and Milton Friedman, the article assesses the role of 
historical interpretation in Neoliberal discourse, highlighting its 
connection with economic theory.
Keywords: Neoliberalism, historiography, political economy.
O Neoliberalismo e os Historiadores
Este artigo analisa o ‘Neoliberalismo’ a partir de uma perspeti-
va histórica, enquanto um movimento político transnacional com 
uma forte inclinação epistémica, apostado em reconfigurar o Esta-
do e construir uma ordem de mercado competitiva. Recorrendo a 
contributos metodológicos da História Intelectual e da Economia 
Política, o artigo debruça-se especificamente sobre as reflexões 
historiográficas levadas a cabo nos primórdios do Neoliberalismo 
por alguns dos seus mais destacados pensadores. Ao examinar 
os escritos de vários intelectuais que integraram a Sociedade do 
Mont Pèlerin – Friedrich Hayek, Karl Popper, T.S. Ashton, Wal-
ter Eucken, Ludwig von Mises e Milton Friedman – o artigo avalia 
o papel da interpretação histórica no discurso Neoliberal, desta-
cando a sua conexão com o pensamento económico.
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Introduction
As Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston have pointed out, the 
last quarter of the twentieth century has seen Neoliberalism ‘become so 
widespread and influential, and so deeply intermingled with critically 
important aspects of life’ as to make it ‘difficult to assess its nature 
and historical importance’.1 The very meaning of the term tends to 
fluctuate across different fields, being alternatively employed to des-
ignate an epoch (‘the age of Neoliberalism’), an intellectual project 
(comprising ‘Ordoliberalism’, the ‘Austrian School of Economics’, the 
‘Chicago School of Economics’ and the ‘Virginia School of Political 
Economy’), and a paradigm of public policy (based on privatization, 
deregulation and supply-side economics). For the specific purpose of 
this article, ‘Neoliberalism’ is to be understood as a transnational po-
litical movement with a strong epistemic bent, engaged in reconfiguring 
state institutions and building a competitive market order. But rather 
than circumvent the polysemic nature of the concept, perhaps the most 
productive approach for an historian is to take into account the differ-
ent levels of reality it evokes. In other words, if we wish to interpret 
‘Neoliberalism’ as a historical phenomenon, we need to untangle the 
interpenetrating layers of discourse developed by its multiple protago-
* Ricardo Noronha (ricardo.noronha@gmail.com). Instituto de História Contemporânea, Fac-
uldade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Av. de Berna, 26 C, 
1069-061, Lisboa.
1 Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, Neoliberalism. A critical reader (London: Pluto 
Press, 2005), 1.
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nists – ranging from businessmen and journalists to politicians and aca-
demics – and elaborate a rigorous mapping of the ideas and theoretical 
debates that have shaped it. This, in turn, will allow us to understand 
how those ideas have contributed to shape the political economy of the 
late twentieth century. 
In that regard, the approach developed by Michel Foucault, in 
a course delivered at the Collège de France, in 1978-1979, offers some 
valuable insights.2 Through an analysis of the German tradition of Or-
doliberalismus (also known as the ‘Freiburg School’) and of the ‘Chica-
go School of Economics’, Foucault highlighted the discursive dimension 
of ‘Neoliberalism’, defining it as a comprehensive set of theories aimed 
at reshaping the institutional and legal framework in order to build 
a competitive market order.3 A similar approach has been taken in a 
collective volume dedicated to the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), a key 
institution within the history of Neoliberalism. In its conclusion, Philip 
Mirowski emphasized the need ‘to explore the numerous and sometimes 
confusing ways in which neoliberal ideas have been historically related 
to each other, to social classes and to political and economic regimes’.4 
Both Foucault and Mirowski called attention to the differences be-
tween twentieth-century ‘Neoliberalism’ – a term coined in Paris in 
1938, during the Colloque Walter Lippmann – and the classical Lib-
eral tradition of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, particularly 
in terms of the role of the state, the notion of ‘laissez-faire’ and the 
nature of markets. The problematic nature of this genealogy has also 
come under the attention of Daniel Stedman Jones, who analysed the 
efforts undertaken by neoliberal intellectuals to reclaim the heritage of 
‘Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment Liberalism’, so as to link up their own 
agenda to a ‘robust historical tradition of economic liberty’.5 Indeed, 
2 Michel Foucault, The birth of Biopolitcs. Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-78 (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2009).
3 Thomas Lemke, ‘«The birth of bio-politics»: Michel Foucault’s lecture at the Collège de 
France on neo-liberal governmentality’, Economy and Society 30, n.º 2 (2001): 190–207.
4 Philip Mirowski and Dieter Plehwe, ed., The road from Mont Pèlerin. The making of the 
Neoliberal Thought Collective (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009), 417-21.
5 Daniel Stedman Jones, Masters of the Universe. Hayek, Friedman, and the Birth of Neoliberal 
Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 100-01.
98 Ricardo Noronha
as both Mirowski and Jones have demonstrated, the term ‘Neoliberal-
ism’ was commonly used by most members of the Mont Pèlerin Society 
throughout the 1950s, signalling a shared commitment to overcome the 
shortcomings of Classical Liberalism. It was only at a later moment 
that Friedman, Hayek and others chose to emphasize the continuity 
between their own views and those of classical liberal authors, such as 
David Hume, Adam Smith or John Stuart Mill. 
A twofold problem arises from this literature: 1) how did promi-
nent Neoliberal intellectuals position themselves regarding the legacy 
of classical Liberalism? 2) what kind of specific challenges did they face 
in their own time that justified the coining of the term ‘Neoliberalism’ 
to describe their common endeavours? Combining Intellectual Histo-
ry and Political Economy, this articles seeks to understand how early 
members of the Mont Pèlerin Society dealt with the problem of histor-
ical interpretation. That was the main theme of the Society’s annual 
meeting in 1951, which took place at Beauvallon (France). The book 
that resulted from the meeting, Capitalism and the Historians, dealt 
primarily with historiographical debates, namely those concerning the 
standard of living during the English Industrial Revolution. But the 
book’s preface, written by its editor, Friedrich Hayek, revealed a much 
broader intellectual ambition. Indeed, rather than simply repeating 
age-old assertions concerning the virtues of laissez-faire economics, 
Neoliberal intellectuals established a critical dialogue with classical 
Liberalism, selecting those ideas that best suited their own political 
agenda. Along the way, as we shall see, they developed a sharp critique 
of historical narratives that called for the growth of state intervention 
and questioned the superiority of the competitive market over econom-
ic planning.
The fact that key topics in historiographical theory and meth-
odology – namely aspects such as causality, agency and structure – 
captured the attention of Neoliberal intellectuals reveals the political 
importance they attributed to the handling of the past, but also the 
epistemic foundations upon which they sought to ground their own 
ideas. The following pages explore the writings of Karl Popper, Fried-
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rich Hayek, T.S. Ashton, Walter Eucken, Ludwig von Mises and Mil-
ton Friedman on the subject of historical interpretation, offering some 
important insights concerning the meaning of the prefix ‘Neo’ in ‘Neo-
liberalism’. By going through some of their major works, the article 
argues that the relation between historiography and economic theory 
lay at the core of the Neoliberal project. 
I. A History of Historicism
Austrian by birth and British by choice, Karl Popper was one of the 
founding members of the Mont Pèlerin Society. Having achieved some 
notoriety as an epistemologist, after publishing Logic of Research: On 
the Epistemology of Modern Natural Science, in 1934, Popper wrote 
several essays on the topic of ‘Historicism’, which appeared in the jour-
nal Economica between 1944 and 1945, but would only be published 
as a book in 1957, with the title The Poverty of Historicism.6 During 
World War II, while exiled in New Zealand, he would further develop 
his arguments in a two volume book, The Open Society and its Ene-
mies. While The Poverty of Historicism was a reflection on methodolo-
gy, primarily aimed at the German Historical School of Economics, The 
Open Society offered a more ambitious ‘history of historicist thought’, 
meant to illustrate ‘its persistent and pernicious influence upon the 
philosophy of society and of politics, from Heraclitus and Plato to He-
gel and Marx’.7 
Popper defined ‘Historicism’ as an approach to the social sciences 
that aimed at ‘historical prediction’, by ‘discovering the «rhythms» or 
the «patterns», the «laws» or the «trends» that underlie the evolution 
of history.’8 ‘Historicism’, he claimed, had little concern for ‘history in 
the traditional sense of a mere chronicle of historical facts’, because 
it was mostly concerned with ‘the study of the operative forces and, 
6 Karl Popper, The Poverty of Historicism (London: Rutledge & Keegan Paul, 1972 [1957]).
7 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies. Vol. II (London: Rutledge & Keegan, 1962).
8 Popper, The Poverty of Historicism, 45.
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above all, of the laws of social development’.9 Popper attributed this to 
a misinterpretation of the role of theory, paired with a disregard for ba-
sic principles of scientific methodology that characterized the represen-
tatives of the German Historical School, like Gustav von Schmoller or 
Werner Sombart. According to him, in their attempt to emulate models 
and explanations from the field of Physics, these scholars had spawned 
‘a peculiar variety of fatalism, a fatalism in regard to the trends of 
history, as it were’.10 ‘Historicism’ was imbued with a teleological inter-
pretation of human history, as if it was ruled by ‘an unchanging law.’ 
Against this, Popper tried to establish a clearer distinction between 
‘theoretical sciences’ (Sociology, Economics and Political Science) and 
‘historical sciences’:
I wish to defend the view, so often attacked as old-fash-
ioned by historicists, that history is characterized by its 
interest in actual, singular, or specific events, rather than 
in laws or generalizations. [...] The situation is simply this: 
while the theoretical sciences are mainly interested in find-
ing and testing universal laws, the historical sciences take 
all kinds of universal laws for granted and are mainly inter-
ested in finding and testing singular statements. [...] In the 
sense of this analysis, all causal explanation of a singular 
event can be said to be historical in so far as the ‘cause’ is 
always described by singular initial conditions.11
Even though historical interpretation could not be mistaken for a 
scientific theory – because it could be neither falsified nor verified – it 
nevertheless demanded the employment of theoretical concepts, since 
historians who claimed to be ‘objective’ were bound to simply ‘adopt 
9 Ibidem.
10 Ibidem, 51.
11 Ibidem, 143-44.
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points of view without being aware of them’.12 Rather than discovering 
the single source of causality behind historical events, the proper task 
for historians was to disentangle causal threads and to describe the ac-
cidental manner in which they were interwoven, making sense of what 
Popper defined as the ‘logic of the situation’:
We need studies, based on methodological individu-
alism, of the social institutions through which ideas may 
spread and captivate individuals, of the way in which new 
traditions may be created, and of the way in which tradi-
tions work and break down. In other words, our individual-
istic and institutionalist models of such collective entities as 
nations, or governments, or markets, will have to be supple-
mented by models of political situations as well as of social 
movements such as scientific and industrial progress.13
Many of these arguments would reappear in The Open Society 
and its Enemies, where Popper deplored the intellectual influence of 
the ‘oracular philosophy of Hegel’ and the ‘prophetical’ claims of Karl 
Marx.14 Emphasizing the specific nature of historical knowledge, Pop-
per argued that there could be no history of ‘the past as it actually did 
happen’. Instead, the discipline depended on the historian’s ‘ability to 
elucidate the facts of history, as well as its topical interest, its ability 
to elucidate the problems of the day’, allowing his interpretation to 
‘speak for itself’.15 More importantly, it was necessary to break with 
the notion that History was in any way charged with a meaning, that it 
allowed to ‘discover the secret, the essence of human destiny’. Instead, 
the purpose of historical interpretation should remain philosophically 
more humble and methodologically more sound:
12 Ibidem, 152.
13 Ibidem, 149.
14 Popper, The Open Society, 193, 198.
15 Ibidem,161-68.
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 Although history has no ends, we can impose these 
ends of ours upon it; and although history has no meaning, 
we can give it a meaning. [...] Neither nature nor history 
can tell us what we ought to do. Facts, whether those of 
nature or those of history, cannot make the decisions for us, 
they cannot determine the ends we are going to choose. It 
is we who introduce purpose and meaning into nature and 
into history. [...] Facts as such have no meaning; they can 
gain it only through our decisions.16 
Popper’s chief argument was that human freedom was incompat-
ible with a deterministic notion of temporality, regardless of how gen-
erous and well-intended. It was precisely because the course of human 
affairs was not pre-established, and did not follow a set of discernible 
rules, that individuals should be free to pursue their own purposes and 
make their own choices. In an ‘Open society’, the fate of an individual 
was not predetermined at the moment of his birth. And even though 
the first example of such a society could be tracked back as far as An-
cient Athens, there was nothing ineluctable or irreversible about either 
its rise or downfall, because History was unpredictable by definition.
 Seen through this light, Popper’s epistemic incursion into the 
field of Historiography was part of a broader effort to keep the past 
open to interpretation, as a way to keep the future open for human 
action. It was also the result of a productive dialogue with the work of 
prominent representatives of the Austrian School of Economics, namely 
the reflections of Carl Menger on scientific methodology and his polem-
ics with the German Historical School in the course of the ‘Methoden-
streit’.17 It therefores comes as little surprise that Popper had so many 
views in common with Friedrich Hayek, one of the great representatives 
16 Ibidem, 278. 
17 Carl Menger, Investigations into the Method of the Social Sciences with Special Reference 
to Economics (New York: New York University Press, 1985). For the role of Carl Menger as 
founder of the Austrian School of Economics, see also: Bruce Caldwell, ed., Carl Menger and 
his Legacy in Economics (Durham: Duke University Press, 1990); Alan Ebenstein, Hayek’s 
Journey. The Mind of Friedrich Hayek (New York: Pallgrave MacMillan, 2003), 19-34.
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of the Austrian School of Economics, who had established himself in 
England, in 1931, at the invitation of Lionel Robbins, to teach at the 
London School of Economics (LSE). The two men knew each other well 
and shared many views regarding scientific knowledge, particularly the 
specific epistemic problems surrounding the social sciences.18 Popper 
attended Hayek’s seminars at the LSE during the 1930s and they fre-
quently exchanged correspondence after he moved to New Zealand. It 
was Hayek, along with Ernst Gombrich, who helped Popper publish 
The Open Society and to find a teaching position at the LSE after 
World War II.
Hayek also took aims at the Historical School. In The counter-rev-
olution of science, he deplored the ‘gradual and almost unperceived 
transition from the historical method of the historian to the scientis-
tic historicism which attempts to make history a «science» and the 
only science of social phenomena.’19 He viewed this transition as an 
understandable reaction against excessive generalization, which had 
prompted scholars to emphasize the ‘singular or unique character of all 
historical phenomena’. In the course of time, however, social scientists 
– ‘particularly economists’, as Hayek cared to stress – had come to 
assume that ‘the empirical study of society’ could provide an adequate 
basis for generalization, serving as ‘an empirical road to the theory of 
their subject.’ This had caused a serious misunderstanding of the role 
of theory within the ranks of the German Historical School. According 
to Hayek, rather than being the result of empirical research, theory 
should be used as a conceptual tool, allowing historians to formulate 
pertinent questions about specific subjects:
The object of scientific study is never the totality of 
all the phenomena observable at a given time and place, 
18 For the connection between Popper and Hayek in the 1930’s, see Eugen Maria Schulak and 
Herbert Unterköfler, The Austrian School of Economics. A History of Its Ideas, Ambassadors, 
and Institutions (Auburn: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2011), 123.
19 Friedrich Hayek, The Counter-Revolution of Science (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 
1955), 64. 
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but always only certain selected aspects: and according to 
the question we ask, the same spatio-temporal situation 
may contain any number of different objects of study. […] 
The application of these considerations to the phenomena 
of human history leads to very important consequences. It 
means nothing less than that a historical process or period 
is never a single definite object of thought but becomes 
such only by the question we ask about it; and that, ac-
cording to the question we ask, what we are accustomed to 
regard as a single historical event can become any number 
of different objects of thought.20
By establishing particular connections between different elements, 
enabling the historian to  identify the ‘complexes of events’ that made 
up his object of study, the role of theory was to offer meaning to words 
like ‘government’ or ‘trade’ or ‘army’, which were not ‘single observable 
things’, but rather, each of them a ‘system of relations which connects 
the parts’.21 Like Popper, Hayek also rejected the depiction of history 
as a mechanical succession of ‘stages’, ‘phases’ and ‘systems’:
From Hegel and Comte, and particularly Marx, down 
to Sombart and Spengler, these spurious theories came to 
be regarded as representative results of social science; and 
through the belief that one kind of “system” must, as a 
matter of historical necessity, be superseded by a new and 
different “system,” they have even exercised a profound in-
fluence on social evolution. This they achieved mainly be-
cause they looked like the kind of laws which the natural 
sciences produced; and in an age when these sciences set 
the standard by which all intellectual effort was measured, 
the claim of these theories of history to be able to pre-
20 Ibidem, 69-70.
21 Ibidem, 71.
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dict future developments was regarded as evidence of their 
pre-eminently scientific character.22
This division of history into different stages, each subordinated 
to its own ‘laws’, made ‘timeless generalizations’ impossible, since his-
torians remained incapable of explaining ‘how different configurations 
of the same elements’ could produce ‘altogether different complexes’ 
according to circumstances of time and place. The formulation of gen-
erally valid assertions was, however, as necessary for the historians as 
for any other social scientist, since there could be ‘no different theories 
for different ages’.23 In this regard, the wrong predicaments of ‘Histor-
icism’, had become an obstacle to the progress of scientific knowledge 
in the field of human and social affairs.
Hayek and Popper shared similar positions regarding the role of 
theory and the validity of historical interpretation, but there were also 
subtle differences between them. Popper was much more sceptical than 
Hayek regarding the possibility of using the past in order to confer 
particular validation to political beliefs. For his part, Hayek was more 
inclined than Popper to seek an underlying causal principle for histori-
cal phenomena. The main difference between them, however, lay in the 
relative importance they attributed to epistemic and political matters. 
Whereas Popper saw Liberalism as the most favourable political doc-
trine for the pursuit of genuine knowledge and scientific truth, Hayek 
was mostly concerned with the use of scientific claims as political argu-
ments against Liberalism. Their mutual hostility towards ‘historicism’ 
brought them together at a specific point of their intellectual trajecto-
ry. It also contributed to shape some of the most important discussions 
during the early years of the Mont Pèlerin Society, to which we must 
now turn our attention.
22 Ibidem, 74.
23 Ibidem, 78-79. 
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II. Industrialization and its discontents
The Road to Serfdom was probably the most successful book ever writ-
ten by Hayek. Published in 1944, it was a political manifesto against 
the rising tide of ‘Socialism’:
How sharp a break, not only with the recent past but 
with the whole evolution of Western civilization, the modern 
trend towards socialism means, becomes clear if we consider 
it not merely against the background of the nineteenth cen-
tury, but in a longer historical perspective. We are rapidly 
abandoning not the views merely of Cobden and Bright, 
of Adam Smith and Hume, or even of Locke and Milton, 
but one of the salient characteristics of Western civilization 
as it has grown from the foundations laid by Christianity 
and the Greeks and Romans. Not merely nineteenth – and 
eighteenth – century liberalism, but the basic individualism 
inherited by us from Erasmus and Montaigne, from Cicero 
and Tacitus, Pericles and Thucydides is progressively relin-
quished.24
The book presented an historical interpretation of the origins of 
Liberalism, establishing a correlation between the growth of trade and 
the rise of freedom. Commercial life had, according to Hayek, allowed 
for ‘the gradual transformation of a rigidly organized hierarchic sys-
tem’ into one where men were capable of ‘knowing and choosing be-
tween different forms of life’. Spreading from Northern Italy to France 
and Germany, during the late Middle Age, and from there to the Low 
Countries and the British Isles, in Early Modern times, commerce had 
achieved its ‘fullest development’ and become ‘the foundation of the 
social and political life’:
24 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (London: Rutledge, 2007 [1944]), 13-14. 
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During the whole of this modern period of European 
history, the general direction of social development was one 
of freeing the individual from the ties which had bound him 
to the customary or prescribed ways in the pursuit of his 
ordinary activities. The conscious realization that the spon-
taneous and uncontrolled efforts of individuals were capable 
of producing a complex order of economic activities could 
come only after this development had made some progress. 
The subsequent elaboration of a consistent argument in fa-
vour of economic freedom was the outcome of a free growth 
of economic activity which had been the undesigned and 
unforeseen by-product of political freedom.25
Liberalism had, according to Hayek, been the result of a sponta-
neous historical process, stemming from an evaluation, carried out by 
the moral philosophers of Enlightenment, of the legal and institutional 
framework required by a free society. Neither a dogma nor a fully de-
veloped system, it was an intellectual and political tradition based on 
the value of individual freedom, which could never be reduced to the 
‘wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, 
above all the principle of laissez-faire’. On the contrary, Hayek insisted, 
‘the crude rules in which the principles of economic policy of the nine-
teenth century were expressed’ had been only a ‘beginning’.26 There 
was, however, an apparent paradox in this argument. Even though 
he attributed the triumph of Liberalism to the increasing freedom of 
trade, Hayek considered the crisis of Liberalism to be the result of an 
intellectual defeat:
For over two hundred years English ideas had been 
spreading eastwards. The rule of freedom which had been 
achieved in England seemed destined to spread throughout 
25 Ibidem, 14-15.
26 Ibidem, 17-18. 
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the world. By about 1870 the reign of these ideas had prob-
ably reached its easternmost expansion. [...] For the next 
sixty years Germany became the centre from which the 
ideas destined to govern the world in the twentieth century 
spread east and west. Whether it was Hegel or Marx, List 
or Schmoller, Sombart or Mannheim, whether it was social-
ism in its more radical form or merely «organization» or 
«planning» of a less radical kind, German ideas were every-
where readily imported and German institutions imitated.27
No explanation was offered as to how ‘English ideas’ could have 
lost ground to ‘German ideas’. Hayek simply changed the logic of cau-
sality, arguing that the ‘intellectual history of the last sixty or eighty 
years’ had been a ‘perfect illustration of the truth that in social evolu-
tion nothing is inevitable but thinking makes it so.’28 In his view, once 
a sense of historical inevitability regarding the role of the state had 
seized the minds of most intellectuals, the belief in the superiority of 
the competitive market had started to falter. 
This belief in the power of ideas would be developed in a later article, 
in which Hayek laid out his strategy to revive the influence of Liberalism 
as ‘an intellectual adventure’.29 He vigorously argued for the need of ‘a 
liberal Utopia’, a program that would not appear to be ‘a mere defence 
of things as they’ were, but rather aim at a ‘truly liberal radicalism’, that 
did not ‘confine itself to what appears today as politically possible’. This 
demanded intellectual leaders who were prepared to resist the ‘blandish-
ments of power and influence’, capable of confronting the ‘susceptibilities 
of the mighty’ and sticking to their principles in order ‘to work for an ide-
al’. In Hayek’s view, it was necessary to make the ‘philosophic foundations 
of a free society once more a living intellectual issue’, capable of challeng-
ing the ‘ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds’. 
27 Ibidem, 21-22.
28 Ibidem, 50.
29 Friedrich Hayek, ‘The Intellectuals and Socialism’, University of Chicago Law Review 16, 
n.º 3 (1949): 432-33.
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The article illustrates the motivation behind the creation of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society, which gathered in Switzerland, in 1947. At-
tempts to form a transnational gathering of liberals had already been 
made, such as the creation of the Comité international d’étude pour 
le renouveau du libéralism, on the wake of the Colloque Walter Lip-
man, in 1938. But Hayek placed particular emphasis in the role of 
ideas and intellectual debate when he resumed the project. The MPS 
brought together politicians, journalists, businessman, but it was pre-
dominantly composed by scholars, namely some of the key represen-
tatives of the Freiburg School, the Austrian School and the Chicago 
School of Economics. Along with a firm commitment to defend the 
free competitive market and individual liberty, the statement of aims 
of the MPS decried the growth of a ‘view of history’ that denied ‘all 
absolute moral standards’ and questioned the ‘desirability of the rule 
of law’, electing as one of its chief purposes the study of ‘methods for 
combating the misuse of history for the furtherance of creeds hostile 
to liberty’.30 From a very early moment, then, Neoliberal intellectuals 
chose History as a decisive battleground for the war of ideas they were 
about to embark upon. 
That was particularly clear at the 1951 annual meeting of the 
society, in Beauvallon (France), where a panel brought together T. S. 
Ashton (United Kingdom), L. M. Macker (United States) and Bernard 
de Jouvenel (France), to debate the treatment of capitalism by the 
Historians. Their presentations would be collected in a book published 
in 1954, Capitalism and the Historians, edited by Hayek.31 In his Intro-
duction, entitled ‘History and politics’, Hayek argued that the influence 
of the ‘writers of history’ over public opinion was ‘probably more im-
mediate and extensive than that of political theorists who launch new 
ideas’. There was, he claimed, ‘scarcely a political ideal or concept’ 
which did not ‘involve opinions about a whole series of past events’. 
And even though historians had the duty to ascertain ‘the facts’, Hayek 
30 Mirowski and Plehwe, The Road from Mont Pèlerin, 15-26.
31 Friedrich Hayek,  ed., Capitalism and the Historians (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1954). 
110 Ricardo Noronha
insisted once again on the idea that ‘theories about the interconnection 
of social processes’ played a decisive role:
Historiography, as distinguished from historical re-
search, is not only at least as much an art as a science; the 
writer who attempts it without being aware that his task is 
one of interpretation in the light of definite values also will 
succeed merely in deceiving himself and will become the 
victim of his unconscious prejudices.32
This passage testifies to the continuity between Hayek’s previous 
writings on ‘Historicism’ and the political importance he attributed to 
historical interpretation. But there had also been a significant transfor-
mation since The Road to Serfdom. He now saw the emergence of the 
competitive market as the result of a favourable institutional setup, 
rather than a mere by-product of the growth of commerce:
The freedom of economic activity which in England has 
proved so favourable to the rapid growth of wealth was proba-
bly in the first instance an almost accidental by-product of the 
limitations which the revolution of the seventeenth century had 
placed on the powers of government; and only after its benefi-
cial effects had come to be widely noticed did the economists 
later undertake to explain the connection and to argue for the 
removal of the remaining barriers to commercial freedom.33
Hayek was particularly interested in the ‘Whig interpretation of history’, 
a designation coined by Herbert Butterfield, in 1931, for the work of British 
historians of the nineteenth century, like Hallam, Macaulay or Acton.34 The 
32 Ibidem, 5. 
33 Ibidem, 14.
34 Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History (London: Bell, 1931). See also Keith 
Sewell, Herbert Butterfield and the Interpretation of History (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
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historical literature produced by these historians had been centred around po-
litical struggle in England during the seventeenth century, namely the defence 
of common law against the attempts for political centralization carried out 
by either the Crown or the Parliament. This historiographical tradition had, 
according to Hayek, given ‘the generations brought up on it a true sense of the 
value of the political liberty which their ancestors had achieved for them’, and 
it was far from casual that it had ‘gone out of fashion with the decline of Lib-
eralism’, allowing the rise of a ‘socialist interpretation of history’. 35 The latter, 
based on a ‘particular view of economic history’, had originated the ‘legend’ 
according to which industrialization caused a severe deterioration of the living 
conditions of the working classes, something which Hayek could not accept:
The widespread emotional aversion to ‘capitalism’ is 
closely connected with this belief that the undeniable growth 
of wealth which the competitive order has produced was pur-
chased at the price of depressing the standard of life of the weak-
est elements of society. […] The actual history of the connection 
between capitalism and the rise of the proletariat is almost the 
opposite to that which these theories of the expropriation of the 
masses suggest. [… ] It was only when the larger gains from the 
employment of machinery provided both the means and the 
opportunity for their investment that what in the past had been 
a recurring surplus of population doomed to early death was in 
an increasing measure given the possibility of survival.36
This was, of course, the main topic of the debate on ‘the stan-
dard of living’ during the nineteenth century.37 The fact that it caught 
the attention of the members of the MPS illustrates the connection 
between history and politics established by Hayek. The refutation of 
35 Hayek, Capitalism and the Historians, 6-7.
36 Ibidem, 15-16. 
37 The ‘standard of living debate’ is partially covered in E. P. Thompson, The Making of the 
English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 189-212. See also Arthur J. Taylor, 
ed., The Standard of Living in Britain in the Industrial Revolution (London: Methuen, 1975).
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a ‘black legend’ – based on misconceptions regarding the underlying 
causes for poverty before and during the process of industrialization – 
was a crucial step to defend that competition was not only a condition 
for economic efficiency, but also beneficial to the large majority of the 
population. The political legitimacy of the ‘free market’ was tied up 
to the evaluation of its historical record, particularly after the crisis of 
the 1930s had favoured the questioning of key principles of Neoclassical 
Economics.  
The intervention of Timothy Ashton, paired with an article he had 
published in the Journal of Economic History (‘The standard of life of 
the workers in England, 1790-1830’), was meant to refute the dominant 
historical interpretation of the industrial take-off in Great Britain. An 
economic Historian and professor at the LSE, Ashton charged the re-
ports written, during the early nineteenth century, by social reformers 
appalled by the living conditions of the poor (the ‘Blue books’), for 
having led to a number of historical misconceptions. Focusing on the 
housing problems in the industrial districts of Lancashire and York-
shire, he argued that this had been caused by wrong fiscal policy and 
government intervention in the credit system (namely the ceilings im-
posed on interest rates, which had caused a shortage of funding for new 
buildings), aggravated by the disruption of international trade during 
the Napoleonic wars, which had raised the prices of building materials 
and wages. Rather than attributing poverty to private businessmen, it 
was necessary to look for more sensible causes. ‘No historian’, Ashton 
concluded, had ‘looked the problem through the eyes of those who 
had the task of building and maintaining the towns’. In spite of the 
numerous problems arising from industrialization, he argued, English 
workers as a whole were far more prosperous than their counterparts 
in any other country of the world at the time. Therefore, even though 
industrialization had had some negative social effects, Ashton insisted 
on the need for a careful handling of data, particularly in regards to 
comparisons between what was the prevalent situation before and after 
the industrial take-off. After challenging the dominant interpretation 
of what had happened in England in the turn of the eighteenth to the 
Neoliberalism aNd the historiaNs 113
nineteenth century – namely the works of Fabians like Arnold Toynbee, 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb or John and Barbara Hammond – Ashton 
went on to criticize the German Historical School from a methodolog-
ical viewpoint: 
A thousand years is an unmanageably long period, and 
so capitalism had to be presented as a series of stages – the 
epochs, respectively, of early, full, and late capitalism, or of 
mercantile capitalism, industrial capitalism, finance capital-
ism, and state capitalism. It is admitted, of course, by those 
who make use of these categories, that there is overlapping: 
that the late stage of one epoch is the early (or, as they say, 
the emergent) stage of the next. But to teach economic histo-
ry in this way – to suggest that commerce, industry, finance, 
and state control are successive dominant forces – is to hide 
from the student, I suggest, the interaction and interdepen-
dence of all these at every period of time. It is bad econom-
ics. Those who write so tend to torture the facts.38
Disparaging towards the ‘illogical and illiberal tendencies’ of most 
of his colleagues, Ashton denounced the careless use of expressions such 
as ‘capitalist spirit’, which presupposed an ‘impersonal, superhuman 
force’, by which it was ‘no longer men and women, exercising their free 
choice, who effect change, but capitalism, or the spirit of capitalism.’ 
The result, he added, was that history was being written ‘as though 
its function were simply to exhibit the gradualness of inevitability.’39 In 
order to counter this pattern of interpretation, he argued for the need 
to reconcile economic theory with economic history, looking at the past 
trough the lenses of Neoclassical Economics. 
This is a clear illustration of the reciprocal influences of Neolib-
eral intellectuals upon one another, allowing us to identify some of the 
38 Hayek, Capitalism and the Historians, 58-59.
39 Ibidem, 62.
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common epistemic concerns that cross-fertilized their work. The refu-
tation of the ‘Socialist interpretation of History’ was inseparable from 
the critique of ‘Historicism’, just as the refusal of teleological narratives 
of History called for methodological debates on the epistemic problems 
faced by the discipline. Far from being a predominantly economic the-
ory of human behaviour, Neoliberalism was, during this early phase of 
the Mont Pèlerin Society, an intellectual project with numerous and 
articulated aims. But Popper, Hayek and Ashton were not alone, nor 
were they the first to look into the problems of historical interpretation.
 Indeed, there is a missing link that usually goes unnoticed in most 
accounts of the history of the Mont Pèlerin Society. In 1951, under the ad-
vice of Hayek, the University of Chicago Press published a book written 
by Walter Eucken (the leading member of the Freiburg School and also a 
founding member of the MPS). First published in Germany in 1940, The 
Foundations of Economics was an attempt to bridge the gulf between 
economic history and economic theory.40 Calling upon the ‘analytical ap-
paratus of economics’ to be ‘extended’, Eucken stressed the interrelation 
between everyday economic life and the broader historical situation, argu-
ing that one could not be understood without the other. He was careful to 
underline the difference between history and theory: whereas the former 
relied primarily on ‘perception, intuition, synthesis, understanding, and a 
feeling for living individual experience’, the latter resorted to ‘reasoning, 
analysis, and the elaboration of analytical models’. It was nevertheless 
necessary to make full use of both, since ‘the actual sequence of economic 
events at any place or time’ could not be understood ‘in the same way as 
other historical facts’, making it necessary to formulate ‘theoretical prop-
ositions’ in order to understand the ‘concrete relationships’ between each 
specific configuration of events, be it the rise of the price of cotton or the 
depreciation of the dollar.41 ‘Knowledge of economic reality or of the real 
world’, Eucken concluded, could only come as ‘an answer to a question’.42 
40 Walter Eucken, The Foundations of Economics. History and Theory in the Analysis of Eco-
nomic Reality (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1992), 10. 
41 Ibidem, 39-43
42 Ibidem, 60. 
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Addressing the relation between classical political economy and 
history, Eucken argued that the moral philosophers of Enlightenment, 
from Montesquieu to Adam Smith, had sought to ‘arrive at generally 
valid and applicable knowledge’, in the form of universal principles. 
Because of that, they had failed to contemplate ‘the variety of in-
stitutions’ at play within the economic system, along with ‘the full 
range of economic reality and its historical development’.43 This, in 
turn, contributed to make the field of Economics ‘doctrinaire’ in the 
course of time. Eucken particularly deplored the fact that the ‘stimulus 
of concrete problems and the force of historical facts’ was no longer 
‘sensed by many theoretical economists’, who resorted to ‘increasingly 
mathematical formulation of economic theory’, remaining ‘incapable of 
explaining the problems of the real world’.44 
Like Popper and Hayek, Eucken criticized the notion that each 
epoch or ‘stage’ of economic development demanded a particular type 
of theory to interpret it.45 He agreed with Hayek regarding the sponta-
neous character of economic transformations, but considered the mod-
ern economic system to be one of the few exceptions to this rule, argu-
ing that it had been deliberately ‘created’ rather than ‘grown’:
Out of the understanding of the interdependence of 
the whole of everyday economic life, and from the discovery 
that competition is a highly effective regulating mechanism, 
the classical economists developed their governing princi-
ples, and proposed great reforms in order to realize these 
principles in practice. […] In this case an economic system 
was to be built on the basis of an economic ‘constitution’. 
By an ‘economic constitution’ we mean the decision as to 
the general ordering of the economic life of a community.46
43 Ibidem, 48-50. 
44 Ibidem, 59.
45 Ibidem, 75.
46 Ibidem, 83.
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The concept of ‘economic constitution’ would become a central 
tenet of Ordoliberalism. It was exemplified by the British monetary 
system and the gold standard, legally implemented by political in-
stitutions according to ‘governing principles, precisely thought out in 
theory’.47 Emphasizing the importance of the ‘Order’ that regulated 
the interaction between economic agents, Eucken concluded that the 
relation between the legal system and the economic system had ‘to 
be studied in the individual context of each historical situation’, since 
it was subject to change in the course of time and did not follow any 
sort of predetermined rule.48 This conclusion was filled with relevant 
implications, namely the particular importance the Freiburg School 
attributed to legal and political institutions, which was the result of 
a particular interpretation of the historical origins of the modern eco-
nomic system. This interpretation followed a strong theoretical imprint 
– drawing inspiration from Neoclassical economics – but did not satisfy 
itself with reasserting axiomatic and timeless assertions.49 By insisting 
in adding the prefix ‘Neo’ to ‘Liberalism’ – both in the Colloque Walter 
Lipman and immediately after the foundation of the MPS – members 
of the Freiburg School remained faithful to this theoretical break. 
Eucken’s insistence on the importance of theory for the study of 
History, along with the notion that economics could not be understood 
without the study of laws and institutions, had a considerable influence 
over Hayek, who received a first-hand copy of his book trough Wilhelm 
Röpke.50 Indeed, the relation between the Austrian School of Econom-
ics and the German Ricardian group (the forbearer of the Freiburg 
School) dated back to the 1920s and it was characterized by permanent 
interchange.51 Eucken and Hayek kept a steady correspondence, which 
47 Ibidem, 84.
48 Ibidem, 87.
49 Eucken and Hans Grossmann-Doerth, a Professor of Law at the University of Freiburg, held 
a joint seminar of jurists and economist between 1933 and 1936, when it was forcefully shut 
down. E. M. Streit, ‘The Freiburg School of Law and Economics’, in The Elgar companion to 
Austrian Economics, ed. Peter Boettke (Cheltenham: Edgar Elgar, 1994), 508-09.
50 Viktor J. Vanberg, ‘Hayek in Freiburg’ in Hayek: A Collaborative Biography, ed. Robert 
Leeson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 94.
51 Nils Goldschmidt and Jan-Otmar Hesse, ‘Eucken, Hayek and The Road to Serfdom’, in 
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included several critical comments by the former on The Road to Serf-
dom. The fact that Hayek latter taught at Freiburg, where he spared 
no compliments regarding Eucken’s importance for his own intellectual 
formation, testifies to the impact of the Foundations of Economics. 
One needs only to remember the introduction to Capitalism and the 
Historians to understand that Hayek was more than merely asserting 
the principles of the Austrian School of Economics. 
Not everyone was equally enthusiastic about this ecumenical at-
mosphere of intellectual debate. Ludwig von Mises, who had enjoyed 
considerable influence over Hayek in his youth, helping him throughout 
the early years of his professional career, disagreed with many of the 
positions shared by Ordoliberals regarding the role of the state and the 
functioning of the competitive market. In his view, the state should 
limit itself to the enforcement of legal contracts and the management of 
foreign affairs. In a book published in 1946, Human Action, Mises for-
mulated his own theory of Economics, ‘praxeology’, which he equated 
with Logic and Mathematics. Drawing on Kant’s notion of ‘a priori’, 
praxeology followed the assumption that individuals pursued deliberate 
aims motivated solely by their desires. It elected as the chief purpose 
of science to take ‘the value judgments of acting man as ultimate data 
not open to any further critical examination’, accepting as its only 
standard ‘whether or not the means chosen are fit for the attainment of 
the ends aimed at’.52 Accordingly, Mises divided the ‘sciences of human 
action’ into two main branches, praxeology and history. He argued that 
history could ‘neither prove nor disprove any general statement in the 
manner in which the natural sciences accept or reject a hypothesis on 
the ground of laboratory experiments’, since it was not ‘an intellectual 
reproduction, but a condensed representation of the past in conceptu-
al terms’.53 ‘Praxeology’, on the other hand, was able to measure the 
success of each action according to the effects it was meant to achieve.
Hayek: A Collaborative Biography, ed. Robert Leeson (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 
123-46.
52 Ludwig von Mises, Human action. A Treatise on Economics (Auburn: The Ludwig von 
Mises Institute, 1998), 21.
53 Ibidem, 31, 48. 
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It is revealing that, even though Human action made several re-
flections on historiography, Mises felt the need to publish an additional 
book on the subject, Theory and History, in 1957.54 After repeating 
many of the arguments he had previously laid out, Mises addressed 
the ‘epistemological problems of History’ in the third part of the book. 
Unsurprisingly, he singled out ideas as ‘the ultimate given of historical 
inquiry’, since they engendered ‘social institutions, political changes, 
technological methods of production, and all that is called econom-
ic conditions’.55 He argued against the ‘deterministic’ view of History 
(namely that of Marx), echoing the arguments laid out by Menger, 
Popper and Hayek against Historicism. More importantly, Mises coined 
up the term ‘thymology’ as a counterpart to praxeology: while the lat-
ter dealt with ‘action as such’, the former was meant to designate ‘the 
knowledge of human valuations and volitions’, that is, the ‘knowledge 
of the social environment in which a man lives and acts’.56 Mises had no 
doubt that studying history was of ‘the utmost practical importance’ 
and belonged to the ‘very essence’ of a liberal education, because even 
though it looked ‘backward into the past’, it taught lessons on the 
‘things to come.57 But he nevertheless kept the distinction between His-
tory and Economics – or rather, between ‘praxeology’ and ‘thymology’ 
– as a fundamental epistemic position. Other than the vague notion 
that ideas were the most important subject for historical interpretation 
and that agency should be ascribed solely to individuals, he said very 
little about the origins of the competitive market. In that regard, he 
was quite distant from the intellectual efforts that were being under-
taken by other members of the MPS, and felt little need to engage in 
the discussion of how or why Liberalism had fallen into crisis. More 
than anything, Theory and History resembled a last ditch defense of 
a doctrine that needed no additional insights, because it had achieved 
the capacity to explain all that was relevant about human action. For 
54 Ludwig von Mises, Theory and History. An Interpretation of Social and Economic Trans-
formation (Yale: Yale University Press, 1957).
55 Ibidem, 187-88. 
56 Ibidem, Theory and History, 265.
57 Ibidem, Theory and History, 291, 293-94.
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Mises, more than for most, the prefix ‘Neo’ had never made sense from 
the start.
As Neoliberalism began to mature, through debate and common 
reflection carried out by intellectuals from different schools of thought, 
some of the dividing lines between them tended to fade. But new ones 
also started to emerge, however subtle, setting apart individuals who 
nominally belonged to the same school. Even though Hayek and Mis-
es did not express their differences openly, it is hard not to find them 
if we read in between the lines of what they wrote. This, too, reveals 
the importance of the subject of historical interpretation for a better 
understanding of Neoliberalism. As we shall see, other, and more rele-
vant, differences would emerge in the course of time, as distinct inter-
pretations of the past materialized in different propositions concerning 
the best way to reaffirm Liberalism in the second half of the twentieth 
century.
III. The Neoliberal interpretation of History
The Constitution of Liberty, Hayek’s magnum opus, was published in 
1960. It was a comprehensive argument in favour of individual freedom, 
the competitive market and the rule of law. It is not always noted, 
however, how ambitious it was in the domain of historical interpreta-
tion. Right from the start, Hayek set about distinguishing between two 
traditions of Liberalism:
The development of a theory of liberty took place 
mainly in the Eighteenth century. It began in two countries, 
England and France. The first of these knew liberty; the 
second did not. As a result we have to the present day two 
different traditions in the theory of liberty: one empirical 
and unsystematic, the other speculative and rationalistic 
– the  first based on an interpretation of traditions and 
institutions which had spontaneously grown up and were 
but imperfectly understood, the second aiming at the con-
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struction of a utopia, which has often been tried but never 
successfully.
These two traditions had parted ways. ‘Rationalistic’ Liberalism 
was the ancestor of ‘Socialism’, while the empiricist tradition was the 
legacy claimed by Hayek. This was a novelty, illustrating the character 
of the Mont Pèlerin Society as a laboratory of theoretical innovation. 
It also provides additional clues concerning the meaning of the prefix 
‘Neo’ in ‘Neoliberalism’. The superiority of the unsystematic tradition 
of Liberalism, Hayek argued, resulted from a better understanding of 
the process of trial and error by which suitable institutions and values 
had been discovered:
While the rationalist tradition assumes that man was 
originally endowed with both the intellectual and the moral 
attributes that enabled him to fashion civilization deliber-
ately, the evolutionist made it clear that civilization was the 
accumulated hard-earned result of trial and error; that it 
was the sum of experience, in part handed from generation 
to generation as explicit knowledge, but to a larger extent 
embodied in tools and institutions which had proved them-
selves superior – institutions whose significance we might 
discover by analysis but which will also serve men’s ends 
without men’s understanding them.58
Hayek presented a developed account of the origins of the rule 
of law and political freedom, his own version the ‘Whig interpretation 
of history’.59 According to him, the concepts of individual liberty and 
rule of law had first appeared in Ancient Athens, through the notion 
of ‘isonomia’, before being perfected during the Roman Republic, by 
58 Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (London: Routledge, 2006 [1960]), 54.
59 This section was based on a previous work, entitled The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law, 
assigned to Hayek by the National Bank of Egypt and published in 1955. 
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classical authors like Cicero, Tacitus or Livy. This intellectual tradition 
would later become a major source of inspiration for those who ral-
lied against political centralization in England during the seventeenth 
century. Modern conceptions of the rule of law had therefore been a 
‘by-product of a struggle for power’, in the course of a ‘dispute about 
the authority to legislate’, rather than resulting from a ‘deliberate aim’. 
The rule of law would gain further consistency through the ‘consti-
tutionalist’ doctrines of ‘checks and balances’ developed during the 
American Revolution, before making its way into Continental Europe, 
through the Civil Codes enacted in Prussia, Austria and Napoleon-
ic France. Such institutional developments had, in turn, allowed the 
functioning of a competitive market order, erecting a barrier against 
discretionary measures undertaken by legislative or executive powers. 
Hayek’s theory of Power and Law – which conceived ‘Freedom’ 
in strictly negative terms, as ‘freedom from coercion’ – was based on 
the claim that institutional innovations had been an accidental result 
of powerful invisible forces. According to him, the functioning of a free 
society relied predominantly on established traditions, born from the 
accumulated experience of many generations. The history that Hayek – 
and other members of the MPS – wanted to tell was meant to serve as a 
warning against those who wished to change social relations according 
to a deliberate rational design. It was the history of the spontaneous 
origins of the market order, emerging as an unforeseen result of the 
struggle against political centralization. And, since any attempt to rad-
ically transform society would most likely disturb the entire social fab-
ric, each one should content oneself with the actual freedom offered by 
the competitive market and the rule of law. Drawing on the insights of 
Edmund Burke, the Neoliberal interpretation of History elaborated by 
Hayek established the limits within which individuals were allowed to 
choose, resembling the sort of fatalism which both him and Popper had 
previously criticized in ‘Historicism’. Liberalism was no longer equated 
with a ‘Utopia’ that challenged the ‘ingenuity and imagination’ of the 
‘liveliest minds’. It had become a rallying point for all those who feared 
radical transformation of the social order.
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Around the same time Hayek was condensing his views on the fu-
ture of Liberalism, a rather more crude approach to history was being 
developed by another founding member of the MPS. Milton Friedman, 
a professor at the Chicago School of Law and Economics, wrote Cap-
italism and Freedom as an American version of Hayek’s The Road to 
Serfdom.60 Published only two years after The Constitution of Liberty, 
Friedman’s book presented a set of easily understandable arguments 
in defence of the competitive market, venturing with great ease in the 
domain of historical interpretation:
Historical evidence speaks with a single voice on the 
relation between political freedom and a free market. I know 
of no example in time or place of a society that has been 
marked by a large measure of political freedom, and that 
has not also used something comparable to a free market to 
organize the bulk of economic activity. Because we live in 
a largely free society, we tend to forget how limited is the 
span of time and the part of the globe for which there has 
ever been anything like political freedom: the typical state 
of mankind is tyranny, servitude, and misery. The nine-
teenth century and early twentieth century in the Western 
world stand out as striking exceptions to the general trend 
of historical development. Political freedom in this instance 
clearly came along with the free market and the develop-
ment of capitalist institutions. So also did political freedom 
in the golden age of Greece and in the early days of the 
Roman era.61
60 For the connection between the two books, see: Rob Van Horn and Philip Mirowski, ‘The 
rise of the Chicago School of Economics and the Birth of Neoliberalism’, in The Road from 
Mont Pèlerin, ed. Dieter Plehwe and Philipe Mirowski (Havard: Harvard University Press, 
2009), 131-68.
61 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 
[1962]): 16.
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In spite of the similarity to Hayek’s main line of argument – in-
deed, Friedman went as far as claiming that The Constitution of Liber-
ty revealed the influence of the Chicago School over its author62 – there 
were some important differences to be noted. Friedman’s book was 
mostly a simplified version of Neoclassical economic theory, punctuated 
by scattered references to the importance of the rule of law, whereas 
Hayek had consistently drawn on History and Philosophy to develop 
his arguments in favour of Liberalism. 
Additionally, the two men had quite different understandings of 
science. In a book published in 1953, Friedman aligned his epistemic 
position with that of Keynes (not John Maynard, but his father, John 
Neville), arguing that any ‘policy conclusion necessarily rests on a pre-
diction about the consequences of doing one thing rather than anoth-
er’.63 He defined ‘positive economics’ as a science ‘in precisely the same 
sense as any of the physical sciences’, the performance of which had to 
be judged by ‘the precision, scope, and conformity with experience of 
the predictions it yields’.64 Unlike Hayek, Friedman believed that econ-
omists should be able to predict the future, making no distinction be-
tween the ‘simple phenomena’ studied by the natural sciences and the 
‘complex phenomena’ dealt with by social scientists. This divergence 
had far greater implications than those we have previously identified, 
either between Popper and Hayek, or between Hayek and Mises. It 
reflected Friedman’s preference for an objectivist view of Neoclassical 
economics, from which the members of the Austrian School had dis-
tanced themselves. It also meant that historical interpretation could be 
used to illustrate the validity of timeless, axiomatic, truths. 
That was to become evident in Capitalism and Freedom, which 
was published in 1962, having been written by Friedman as an Amer-
ican counterpart to Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom. Whereas industri-
alization had been the main topic of Capitalism and the Historians, 
62 Ebenstein, Hayek, 141.
63 Milton Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1953), 4
64 Ibidem, 7.
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Friedman elected the ‘Great Depression’ of 1929-1933 as the historical 
event that had contributed the most to undermine the confidence in 
the superiority of the competitive market, by reinforcing the belief that 
a ‘private free-enterprise economy’ was ‘inherently unstable’ if left to 
itself.65 As the argument went, what had come to legitimize the growth 
of government intervention and the entire political economy of the New 
Deal was an outright error of historical interpretation. Far from being 
a sign of the inherent instability of the ‘private enterprise system’, the 
Great depression had, according to Friedman, been the result of wrong 
monetary measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve, which had con-
verted ‘what otherwise would have been a moderate contraction into 
a major catastrophe’.66 He considered it to be necessary to invert the 
trend, pursuing a ‘government of law instead of men’ and creating 
strict rules in order to prevent ‘monetary policy from being subject to 
the day-by-day whim of political authorities’.67 In this particular brand 
of Neoliberal interpretation of history, conclusions stemmed almost au-
tomatically from what were taken to be historical ‘facts’. 
The argument presented in Capitalism and Freedom would be de-
veloped in a more systematic way in A Monetary History of the United 
States, a book written by Milton Friedman and Anne Schwartz, under 
the sponsorship of the National Bureau of Economic Research. A vast 
amount of statistical data, covering a century of economic history, from 
the end of the American Civil War until the Kennedy administration, 
was compiled with the chief purpose of demonstrating that monetary 
policy had a greater impact on business cycles than economic theory 
had hitherto recognized. In order to explain the economic role of mon-
ey, Friedman and Schwartz used History as testing ground for their 
hypothesis. The rationale for this exercise is be found in a passage of 
Friedman’s essay on positive economics:
65 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 39.
66 Ibidem, 44-48.
67 Ibidem, 49
Neoliberalism aNd the historiaNs 125
Unfortunately, we can seldom test particular predic-
tions in the social sciences by experiments explicitly de-
signed to eliminate what are judged to be the most im-
portant disturbing influences. Generally, we must rely on 
evidence cast up by the “experiments” that happen to oc-
cur. […] Occasionally, experience casts up evidence that is 
about as direct, dramatic, and convincing as any that could 
be provided by controlled experiments. Perhaps the most 
obviously important example is the evidence from inflations 
on the hypothesis that a substantial increase in the quanti-
ty of money within a relatively short period is accompanied 
by a substantial increase in prices.68
The evolution of the money stock during an entire century was 
one of the closest things to a ‘controlled experiment’ that an economist 
could hope for, since it allowed the observation of monetary experience 
under sufficiently disparate conditions to sort out what was ‘common’ 
from what was ‘adventitious’.69 Under these premises, Friedman and 
Schwartz set about dissecting the economic history of the United State, 
making a precise incision into it, as if monetary circuits were the circu-
latory system of a living creature. They considered the creation of the 
Federal Reserve System, in 1914, to be ‘a major watershed in American 
monetary history’.70 Before that, there had been a ‘blind, undesigned, 
and quasi-automatic’ monetary regime (the Gold Standard), capable 
of ensuring ‘a greater measure of predictability and regularity’ than 
the ‘deliberate and conscious control’ exercised by the ‘System’. The 
disadvantages of the latter had become manifest in the course of time. 
Friedman and Schwartz concluded that the drastic decline in the stock 
of money after 1929, paired with the occurrence of a banking panic 
of unprecedented severity, had occurred because the Federal Reserve 
68 Friedman, Essays in Positive Economics, 10-11.
69 Milton Friedman and Anne Schwartz, A Monetary History of the United States 1867-1960 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 676, 687-88.
70 Ibidem, 8.
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System did not use its ‘ample powers’ to cut short the ‘tragic process 
of monetary deflation and banking collapse’.71 This, in turn, revealed 
a specific type of correlation between monetary policy and economic 
activity: 
Changes in the money stock are therefore a conse-
quence as well as an independent source of change in money 
income and prices, though, once they occur, they produce 
in their turn still further effects on income and prices. Mu-
tual interaction, but with money rather clearly the senior 
partner in longer-run movements and in major cyclical 
movements, and more nearly an equal partner with money 
income and prices in shorter-run and milder movements – 
this is the generalization suggested by our evidence.72
Although this sort of generalization was well below the standards 
of the ‘natural sciences’, it offered monetary authorities what appeared 
to be a coherent theoretical explanation for the problems they were 
up against. The core of the book explained how to handle an econom-
ic depression caused by deflation and shortage of liquidity. But its 
conclusion, dug out from the vast amount of data collected from the 
archives of the Federal Reserve System, was equally useful to tack-
le down inflation.73 More importantly, the whole book questioned the 
Keynesian argument for imperative management by the government, 
since it attributed the crisis to the monetary authorities, rather than 
the behaviour of investors.74 
From a conceptual standpoint, Friedman’s approach had much in 
common with what the Austrian School had criticized about ‘Histori-
71 Ibidem, 11. 
72 Ibidem, 695.
73 Ibidem, 676.
74 This point is particularly highlighted in Lanny Ebenstein, Milton Friedman. A Biography 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 113-28.
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cism’. It elected ‘prevision’ as its main aim, showing little consideration 
for epistemic concerns that could hamper the discipline’s capacity to 
influence policy-makers. It established very simple mechanisms of cau-
sality, in order to support the claim that monetary authorities were 
less capable of ensuring price stability than an impersonal mechanism 
geared to the market. It handled its data in a very straightforward di-
rection, so as to draw the theoretical conclusion that fiscal policy and 
government spending were unable to achieve full employment in the 
long run. 
The strength of this argument would only become manifest a few 
years later, when public opinion (or at least a determinant part of it) 
grew tired of rising prices. Friedman himself had little doubt about the 
mechanisms of causality that presided over historical transformation:
The change in the climate of opinion was not pro-
duced by this book or the many others, such as Hayek’s 
Road to Serfdom and Constitution of Liberty, in the same 
philosophical tradition. […] The change in the climate of 
opinion was produced by experience, not by theory or phi-
losophy. [...] Only a crisis actual or perceived produces real 
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken 
depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, 
is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing pol-
icies, to keep them alive and available until the politically 
impossible becomes politically inevitable.75
According to this view, History was a testing ground for economic 
theory, allowing the refutation of a dominant scientific hypothesis and 
its replacement by another. Intellectuals merely predicted what the 
force of events would come to demonstrate. And, in the process, they 
laid out the ideas that were necessary to create an alternative. 
75 Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, 6-7.
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Of course, this sort of simplification was precisely what the Mont 
Pèlerin Society had initially rallied against. But that did not prevent 
Friedman, along with other representatives of the Chicago School of 
Economics (many of whom also belonged to the MPS), from casting 
aside most of the epistemic concerns that characterized the writings of 
Popper, Hayek, Acton, Eucken or Mises. The interpretation of History 
that underpinned their work assumed that ‘facts’ had a definite mean-
ing, because they were subject to what, for all purposes, resembled 
‘laws’. Quite simply, such ‘laws’ – drawn from the timeless truths of 
Neoclassical economics and expanded trough highly abstract mathe-
matical models – did not point to a growing intervention of the State 
in economic affairs, but rather in the opposite direction. History had 
changed its course.
Conclusion
Reading Neoliberalism from the angle of Intellectual History allows us 
to understand the initial scope of its epistemic and political ambitions. 
As early as the 1940s, Karl Popper and Friedrich Hayek had questioned 
the notion that social sciences should emulate the paradigm of Physics, 
calling for a more sophisticated understanding of the role of theory, 
along with a more rigorous assessment of causality. Likewise, they con-
sidered the idea that history unfolded through a predictable succession 
of stages, according to ‘Historical Laws’, to be a crude simplification 
and a denial of human freedom. The importance they attributed to 
historical interpretation concerned both the political legitimacy of the 
competitive market order and the possibility of understanding the evo-
lution of society in the course of time. 
These insights were reflected in the Mont Pèlerin Society’s state-
ment of aims, which directly identified the interpretation of History as 
a matter of concern for all of those engaged in the renewal of Liberal-
ism. The importance that the members of the Society attributed to the 
role of ideas led them to engage in a systematic attempt to challenge 
the supremacy of ‘Socialists’ over historical interpretation. This was 
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one of the chief motivations behind the works of Walter Eucken and 
Ludwig von Mises, during and immediately after World War II, each 
following his own specific ideas. The topic would deserve further at-
tention at the Society’s annual meeting in 1951, from which the book 
Capitalism and the Historians resulted. At that stage, Neoliberal intel-
lectuals were particularly concerned with the interpretation of indus-
trialization in Great Britain, namely the fact that historians frequently 
reached conclusions that undermined the legitimacy of the competitive 
market. While Timothy Ashton engaged himself in the historiograph-
ical debate on the standard of living of the working class during the 
nineteenth century, Hayek used the ‘Whig interpretation of History’, 
a nineteenth-century British historiographical tradition, as a source of 
inspiration for his own historical narrative of the spontaneous origins 
of the competitive market order.
A much more successful Neoliberal interpretation of History 
would, however, be developed by Milton Friedman at a later moment. 
According to his methodological principles, there were no reasons to 
distinguish between the natural and the social sciences, since both 
should aspire to formulate generally valid conclusions about the phe-
nomena they studied, allowing for prediction. Friedman wrote A Mon-
etary History of the United States, along with Anne Schwartz, in or-
der to validate his own scientific theory of money. Specific features of 
Historicism were thus revived within the ranks of Neoliberalism, as it 
started to display a more ‘technical’ profile. In the course of time, a set 
of claims concerning the functioning of governments, markets, money, 
society and human behaviour emerged as a unified doctrine, usually 
presented as ‘sound economics’. That was, as we have seen, a major 
break with the commitment of early MPS members to elaborate a con-
sistent body of ideas in support of individualism and the free market.  
We can therefore conclude that the differences that existed within 
the MPS became increasingly more evident as Neoliberalism developed 
and matured. In this regard, the connection between different ways of con-
ceiving economics and different ways of imagining the past proved to be 
an important one. Those with an Austrian (or Ordoliberal) intellectual 
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background regarded history as a complex phenomenon, a set of undeter-
mined events with multiple sources of causality, that could not be entirely 
measured and had to be approached tentatively. Those associated with the 
Chicago School were more prone to use history as a testing ground, estab-
lishing correlations between a few simple variables and using mathematical 
induction in order to prove or dispprove their hypothesis. The reasons why 
the intellectual tradition developed in Chicago would become more success-
ful in the field of Economics are beyond the scope of this article. But the 
contrast between the cautious approach put forth in Capitalism and the 
Historians and the confident tone of Friedman’s writings on change and 
causality is a good lead for further investigation into the subject. 
In spite of methodological and theoretical differences, all of the intellec-
tuals who gathered in the Mont Pèlerin Society (with perhaps the exception 
of Popper) identified the market as an insurmountable institution, which no 
rational design could successfully replace. This did not, however, mean that 
they all looked onto the past, and specifically to the Classical Liberal tradi-
tion which they all claimed as a common source of inspiration, in the same 
way. In this regard, the prefix ‘Neo’ signalled a particular understanding of 
history, according to which Liberalism was conceived both as the final stage 
of human existence and as a set of ideas that needed to be renewed in order 
to keep up with the course of time. For Neoliberal intellectuals, the inheri-
tance of Liberalism had not been preceded by any testament.  
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